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mind that interacts with the created cosmos is incoherent. G&T assess such
critiques and argue persuasively that the charges of incoherence are either
just overstated (as no problems of a strictly logical nature are evident) or
involve an illicit assumption of naturalist or physicalist tenets.
An appendix to the volume briefly develops and defends the so-called
“Argument From Reason”—a perhaps more rigorous heir of the argument
presented by C. S. Lewis and others—with the conclusion that naturalism
is ultimately self-defeating since the view has implications that would undermine the very arguments that might otherwise support it.
Overall, Goetz and Taliaferro have managed to explain and assess
naturalism in a way that is at once concise, careful, and clear. I know of
no other work engaging metaphysical naturalism that matches this one
for these virtues. They allow leading naturalists to speak for themselves,
sometimes at length, but mere “cut-and-paste” is avoided by skillful editing and lively interaction with the views discussed. The result is that the
reader is likely to come away with a better understanding of the worldview itself as well as the most significant difficulties that confront it. And
the book is a model of careful philosophical argumentation and worldview assessment. It should appeal to a wide audience that includes professional philosophers, undergraduates and graduate students, seminarians, pastors, and interested laypersons. And it should serve as a fine text
for a number of courses, including introduction to philosophy, philosophy
of religion, and apologetics. I have, for many years, taught a course titled
Major Worldviews, which features naturalism and theism, among other
views. This book should become a staple for such a course.

Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, by Philip L. Quinn. Edited by Christian
Miller. Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. 315. $49.95 (paper)
KEVIN MEEKER, University of South Alabama
This posthumously published collection of essays is the best of books and
the worst of books. It is the best of books: Philip L. Quinn’s influential and
thought-provoking essays provide a scintillating tour de force of some
of the most important topics in philosophy of religion in the past four
decades. It is the worst of books: It hauntingly reminds us that he is no
longer with us to help us think through these important issues. Despite
reminding us of our loss, this volume furnishes us with a golden opportunity to consider the breadth and depth of Quinn’s omnifarious interests in
the philosophy of religion.
The book begins with a memorably poignant foreword by Eleonore
Stump. Editor Christian B. Miller, a former Quinn student, next offers a
fine survey of Quinn’s life and work as well as the essays in the volume.
The book reprints fourteen essays, divided into six sections that provide
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a representative sample of much of Quinn’s work; it naturally includes
some of his famous development and defense of the divine command/will
theory of ethics. Sadly, I do not here have the space to discuss every essay
(for a survey that briefly summarizes every essay, see Robert Roberts’s review at http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=11964). So let me focus on some
of the main motifs that run through many of the essays.
After reading this book, I was struck by the number of times that discussions of Kant or broadly Kantian issues occupied center stage. All
three essays in the Topics in Christian Philosophy section discuss Kant
extensively, with the last two advertising this focus in their titles: “Kantian
Philosophical Ecclesiology” and “Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification” (which was selected by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the top
ten philosophy papers of 1986). The section on Religion and Political Liberalism contains two essays that spend a great deal of time critically analyzing the ideas of John Rawls, arguably the most famous neo-Kantian of
the twentieth century. Moreover, even the title of the second essay in this
section gestures towards Kant: “Religious Citizens within the Limits of
Public Reason.” The last section on Religious Diversity contains “Towards
Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity,” in which
Quinn offers a limited defense of the rationality of adopting some suitably modified version of John Hick’s neo-Kantian pluralism. Of course,
Quinn’s work on ethics and tragic dilemmas not only frequently discusses
Kant but also promotes the Kantian primacy of the will over the virtues,
most explicitly in his “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics” (for
an Aristotelian response, see Roberts’s review mentioned above).
Perhaps the most interesting and pervasive theme revolves around
Kant’s treatment of killing on the basis of a divine command. In Religion
within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant argues, roughly speaking, that one
is never justified in killing someone on the basis of what one perceives to
be a divine command because one could always be mistaken about the
source or content of such a command. Even in the famous story of Abraham and Isaac, Kant contends that Abraham (or anyone similarly situated) should have been so certain that it was wrong to sacrifice Isaac that he
should have dismissed his experiences of God commanding him to do so
as illusory or somehow mistaken. Quinn’s reflections on Kant’s discussion
figure prominently in four of the six sections, including the first chapter
“Religious Obedience and Moral Autonomy” as well as the last chapter
“On Religious Diversity & Tolerance.” Although Quinn is certainly no obsequious devotee of Kant on this point, he sees “promise in a chastened
Kantianism that proceeds on a case by case basis to deploy moral beliefs of
high epistemic status as levers . . . to move churches and their members in
the direction of reforming ecclesiastical arrangements and reinterpreting
scriptures” (p. 271). Along these lines he approves, to some degree, of fellow divine command theorist Robert Adams’s general “methodology that
allows for ethical sources independent of theology to exert critical leverage on theological ethics” (p. 271). As I understand it, a crucial feature of
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chastened Kantianism is that independent moral beliefs that fall far short
of epistemic certainty may still function as levers to counteract religiously
based arguments for what would otherwise seem to be an immoral practice. But implementing this strategy requires one to work harder to show
that the independent ethical beliefs possess a higher epistemic status than
any contrary beliefs. In his “On Religious Diversity & Tolerance,” Quinn
interestingly applies this broad “piecemeal strategy” (p. 303) of chastened
Kantianism to intolerant practices of any religion, drawing on the idea
that the religious diversity of the world should significantly lower the justification one might have for believing that an intolerant practice is acceptable. This lowering of the confidence in one’s own religious practices
presumably could allow norms from ethical sources independent of one’s
theology to override one’s commitment to the intolerant practice.
It is unfortunate that this suggestion appears in the last essay he completed before his death. Exploring the many issues raised by this argument
could prove most fruitful indeed. Taking a broad view of this chastened
Kantian strategy, it is clear that one question immediately requiring an answer is the following: What is the independent source of the ethical norms
that are “to exert critical leverage on theological ethics”? Philosophical
ethics seems a non-starter. After all, the Kantian hope of uniting rational
agents of the world around a universally accepted form of practical reason
that underwrites the epistemic strength of moral principles has fallen by
the wayside, leaving us with what Quinn calls a “reasonable pluralism in
moral theory” (p. 269). If it is reasonable to adhere to any number of these
competing philosophical theories about morality, then some (particularly
those within a particular theological tradition) may question whether any
one of them could produce an ethical norm that has enough warrant to
trump a contrary norm from theological ethics (or to make it rationally
obligatory to abandon the norm from theological ethics). I take it that this
problem is exacerbated if we consider Quinn’s own divine command/will
theory as one of the philosophical theories about morality that one could
reasonably adopt.
Of course few people look to philosophy to ground their moral judgments. Many would contend that common sense can trump theological
concerns by providing us with access to an independent source of basic
ethical norms presumably shared by most ethical theories. More specifically, some could argue that the moral intuition that it is wrong, say, to
sacrifice Isaac, is so strong that it can trump any purported divine command to the contrary (in a slightly different context Quinn seems to
consider this way of arguing in his “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal
Theory,” pp. 49–50). Interestingly, Quinn himself defends the possibility
of Kierkegaardian conflicts (in which, roughly speaking, one must choose
between following an indefeasible divine command and a conflicting
moral requirement which is not overridden) against “common sense” objections. As he puts it in his essay “Moral Obligation, Religious Demand,
and Practical Conflict,” “When philosophy succeeds in [bringing us to see
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new possibilities], it teaches us that the world might be stranger by far
than pedestrian common sense would allow” (p. 91). Moreover, Quinn
also recognizes that one’s thoughts on these possible conflicts can be surreptitiously influenced by one’s culture. While he defends the possibility
that one could be justified in believing that one is facing a Kierkegaardian
conflict, he candidly admits that he cannot imagine being actually justified
in believing that he is facing a Kierkegaardian conflict. He concedes that
this skepticism might
show that, being situated as I am in a predominantly secular culture, I can
conceive of certain possibilities for justified belief that I cannot quite imagine
being actual for me. If it showed this, I would be under pressure to admit
that my culture has the power to shut me off from understanding imaginatively and firsthand the kind of faith needed to play the role of Abraham.
And I would be reluctant to concede so much influence in determining what
I can imagine to the contingencies of my culture. Like many intellectuals,
I am inclined to fancy I can transcend, if only in imagination, most of the
limits of my culture. But perhaps the range of my imagination is severely
constricted just because I am to a large extent the product of an incredulous
culture. (p. 91)

If Quinn is correct about the extent to which culture can affect even one’s
imagination, then some might justifiably worry about the legitimacy of
any independent moral leverage one tries to place on theological ethics.
In short, chastened Kantianism faces significantly high hurdles. Quinn
himself has done such a tremendous job of chastening Kantianism that one
might wonder if any meat remains on this theoretically thin skeleton of
Kantianism that can nourish a research program. Moreover, his own defense of divine command/will theories of ethics at times appears to insulate certain kinds of theological ethics from any Kantian heat, especially in
an environment of “reasonable pluralism in moral theory.” Despite these
high hurdles, I hope that philosophers of religion will further explore this
topic, as well as many others that are broached by Quinn in these essays,
even if they do not agree with all of his settled views.
To conclude with a succinct assessment: This is an excellent book. One
can read it with great profit not only because of the important topics covered but also because of the way in which Quinn approaches these issues.
Having offered this assessment, I should probably note, in the interest of
full disclosure, that Quinn directed my dissertation. My interactions with
him allowed me to experience his exemplary spirit: he was conscientious,
forthright, helpful, honest, kind, and thoughtful, to name just a few of
his virtues. Discussing philosophy with him was a cooperative enterprise,
not a competitive one. Most happily, those who did not get a chance to
interact personally with him can, in these essays, catch a glimpse of these
and related virtues that are worthy of emulation: a piercingly clear writing style that effectively gets to the heart of a philosophical issue, personal
engagement with and Socratic self-reflection on crucial issues (as seen in
the quotation above), prioritizing intellectual honesty over argumentative
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“one-upmanship” (see some of his gracious concessions in the debate with
Plantinga on religious epistemology: “The Foundations of Theism Again:
A Rejoinder to Plantinga”), and exhibiting the way in which crisp philosophical thinking can be informed by the history of philosophy and literature, perhaps best exemplified in Quinn’s riveting treatment of Shusaku
Endo’s novel Silence in his “Tragic Dilemmas, Suffering Love, and Christian Life.” Surely these essays bear vivid testimony to the fact that the
philosophical landscape is a richer place because of Philip Quinn.1
1
Thanks to T. Allan Hillman, Christian Miller and Ted Poston for comments on drafts of
this review.

Was Jesus God?, by Richard Swinburne. Oxford University Press, 2008. 175
pp. $24.95 (hardback)
GLENN B. SINISCALCHI, Duquesne University
A little over ten years ago, Pope John Paul II urged philosophers to provide
bold arguments to establish the preconditions of divine revelation: “Consider, for example, the natural knowledge of God, the possibility of distinguishing divine Revelation from other phenomena or the recognition
of its credibility, the capacity of human language to speak in a true and
meaningful way even of things which transcend all human experience.”1
Other than being one of the world’s finest Christian philosophers and the
author of many books and articles on various philosophical topics, Richard Swinburne has faithfully served the Church with an apologetic vision
that is clear, courageous, and convincing. His most recent book on the
subject is no different.
Although Was Jesus God? is not as philosophically rigorous as his trilogy on the philosophy of religion, it can be read as a sequel to any of
his previous publications on natural theology. Because he focuses on the
reasons to believe in Jesus’s divinity in this volume, he does not provide a
new battery of arguments for God’s existence which can only show that a
“bare” or “bland” theism is true. So long as one assumes that God exists,
the reader will be able to benefit from Swinburne’s newest rationale to believe in Jesus. “Christian theism,” he rightly points out, “can be true only
if bare theism is true” (p. 23).
The first prong in the overall argument for Jesus’s divinity consists of
the pertinent reasons that can be utilized apart from the influence of divine revelation to show that God is the kind of God who would want to
become a human and do the types of things that Jesus would do. Thus,
Swinburne’s first goal is to describe and explain the “a priori reasons” for
expecting God to become incarnate in human history. A priori reasons
John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, N. 67.
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